• 论恐怖主义的社会解构

    作者简介 刘乐,中国社会科学院亚太与全球战略研究院助理研究员。 摘要 作为一种极端的解构力量,恐怖主义对于国际秩序的威胁和损害不仅在于通过制造恶性事件以破坏国际社会的安全稳定,更在于借助销蚀主流价值而削弱国际秩序的观念基础。因此,国际社会有必要将评估和应对恐怖主义的社会解构纳入反恐治理的基本范畴。其中,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量进行社会解构的行为策略,可以分为以动摇当代领土政治、颠覆主流生命伦理和创设替代政治秩序为主要构成的重释再造,以动员恐怖袭击、滋长恐怖气氛和催生仇恨敌对为主要构成的“木马”植入,以“黑色经济”“黑色宣传”和“黑色技术”为主要构成的反向利用。目前,国际社会的反恐路径注重结合预防恐怖主义的内向防御逻辑与打击恐怖主义的外向进攻逻辑。沿着这一思路,国际社会可以综合采取加强反恐实践中的逆向战略、修正反恐叙事中的敌意话语和联通反恐治理中的不同系统等多种举措以应对恐怖主义的社会解构。   关键词:恐怖主义;社会解构;反恐治理;世界秩序   恐怖主义与反恐治理是当代国际安全的重要议题。对于国际社会来说,恐怖主义威胁所造成的冲击与挑战、动荡与失序不仅表现为其在物理层面所输出的袭击与暴力,更来自其在心理层面所进行的侵蚀和消解。   作为国际体系的边缘性力量,恐怖主义活动反映出其反体系行为的极端面向。无论是刻意还是无意,恐怖主义都通过自身的话语叙事和行为实践而对当前主流社会的价值基础和意义体系造成了一定程度的社会解构。因此,本文主要以“伊斯兰国”组织(Islamic State,Daesh)为案例,尝试去梳理和讨论以此为代表的恐怖主义力量通过哪些行为策略而对哪些社会意义进行消解和侵蚀。     一、恐怖主义的重释再造 任何国际秩序都建立在一定的观念共识和行为规范的基础之上。进而,持续稳定的意义建构和价值安排共同形塑了主流国际社会的认识框架与实践内容。当然,这一秩序框架往往也会遭到体系内不同类型行为体的削弱和破坏。对于作为国际体系边缘性力量的恐怖主义来说,其对主流国际价值最为直接的冲击方式和挑战手段就是对国际社会既有的意义价值进行重新阐释和再次塑造。   重释再造是一种典型的价值竞争策略,它将已经被习得和内化的观念推翻重构,从而将既有的意义联结进行去合法化,寻求树立自身意义联结的合理性。以“伊斯兰国”组织为例,它对社会意义进行重释再造的行为策略主要分为动摇当代边界政治、颠覆主流生命伦理、创设替代政治秩序三个方面。   (一)动摇当代边界政治 《威斯特伐利亚和约》重新划定了欧洲各国的边界,标志着现代民族国家体系的肇始。威斯特伐利亚体系的重要特征是确立了领土主权原则。这一原则延续至今,基本得到了主权国家的遵守,并随着民族主义意识形态的兴起而根深蒂固。但这一原则却毫不为以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量所认可和依循。在其看来,所谓的边界概念只是地域上对已经征服与还未征服地域的临时性划分(因而可以延伸拓展),而非国际社会中的主权国家就领土范围达成的永久性条约(因而具有约束效力)。恐怖组织对当代边界政治的重释再造包括两个方面:   第一,否定既有边界安排。国境和领土是当代边界政治的重要构成要素。其中,现代中东地缘版图的确立始于英国和法国于1916年秘密达成的《赛克斯-皮科协定》。但是,诸如“伊斯兰国”组织等恐怖主义力量却不仅对这一边界划分置若罔闻、视若无睹,甚至还大肆鼓吹要彻底终结这种边界政治。   例如,“伊斯兰国”组织在其官方杂志《达比克》(Dabiq)中,就公开宣扬和积极号召重建“哈里发”,并夸下海口要进一步扩张成为一个全球性的“哈里发”帝国。通过鼓动全球吉哈德运动,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量意欲颠覆以主权国家为主体的威斯特伐利亚体系,进而妄图摧毁建立在这种边界政治基础之上的国际秩序。   “伊斯兰国”组织不同于那些在主权国家体系下寻求改变现状而实现权势增长的修正主义国家,它寻求的绝非是在既有国际体系中权力的重新分配,而是要去颠覆和重释国家间边界的政治概念。正是因为这种意识形态如此根深蒂固,即使“伊斯兰国”组织面临连丢城池节节败退、实控领土日益萎缩的覆灭之势,这种观念主张也仍然能够通过某种政治说辞以实现自我安慰和想象满足。因此,这种价值观念只会随着恐怖组织实体力量的式微而在其政治选择中暂时退居内隐,而并非就势倾颓匿迹。   第二,进行对外渗透扩张。为实现对于既有领土安排和边界政治的重释再造从而汲取权力并扩大影响,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量进行了相应的领土渗透和对外扩张。它们立足于自身的武装据点,寻求进行对外攻伐征略与辐射扩张,特别是将主要对象目标锁定在那些国家控制力量薄弱和社会治理失败低效的混乱地区;同时,它们还积极发展国际渗透网络,进行跨区域的战略动员和组织流动,意图通过建立和支持各种海外“行省”或“辖区”(wilayah)、“飞地”和分支力量,从而拓展自身的政治版图。   国家行为体的认同建构主要是面向本国国民,与此不同的是,恐怖主义与极端组织的认同建构是超国家和跨区域的,例如“基地”组织建立的三层体系与“伊斯兰国”组织制订的三环战略。特别是随着“内环”战事的节节失利,“伊斯兰国”组织更是加大了西至北非、东至中南亚的双向转移和外线扩张。借此,这些恐怖组织的战略动员不只局限于特定的国界范围之内,而从不同的节点辐射至周边、延伸至区域,甚至是扩展到全球。   (二)颠覆主流生命伦理 任何社会的发展都必然建立在特定的伦理和道德基础之上,而一个社会公序良俗的确立也必然依托于社会主体之间基本的行为界限。对于主流社会来说,其赖以维系的观念基石就是尊重人的意义与存在价值。因此,一个健康成熟的主流社会定然不会弘扬自杀与杀他行为。但是,恐怖组织动员恐怖分子进行的自杀式恐怖袭击(suicide terrorism)和对暴力行为伦理底线的突破,却在很大程度上侵蚀和消解着这一主流社会的生命伦理。   第一,教唆自杀式恐怖袭击。毋庸讳言,我们必须承认自杀式恐怖袭击在某种程度上是一种理性的行为选择,它有着自洽的行为逻辑和心理基础。但是恐怖组织对这种行为的吹捧、操纵和鼓动却对人的意义与存在价值构成了根本威胁。   一方面,恐怖组织以各种虚妄不实的“空头支票”来向恐怖分子许诺在“彼世”的美好生活图景,以此来迷惑和诱使其就范; 另一方面,恐怖组织则以各种所谓宗教“牲献”的华丽言辞来粉饰开脱这种行径的暴虐,从而减缓恐怖分子在发动自杀袭击时所承受的道德压力和负罪感。   但是,这些宣传和说辞显然无法被主流社会所接纳,更无法在其价值基础和意义体系中立足。在主流社会看来,人之所以为人而得以超越动物性的一个方面在于,人可以认知和处理“个体中的群体”(group inindividual)与“群体中的个体”(individual in group)之间的关系。也就是说,由于社会在场的作用,人不仅可以寻求自我的存续,还可以照顾他人的存续,继而进行人际与群际的互动和协作。   而恐怖主义却恰恰在颠覆这个逻辑:在其看来,只有危及而非尊重你及你所在群体的存续,才能保证我及我所在群体的存续;在此基础上,针对平民的恐慌“生产”成为实现其政治目标的关键手段。恐怖袭击正是基于这一观念逻辑所产生的行为实践,其中又以自杀式恐怖袭击为典型代表,从而对主流社会的生命伦理造成了最大冲击。   第二,突破武力行为的伦理底线。在有关武装暴力的道德立场中,现实主义与和平主义分据两个观念极端,正义战争理论(Just War Theory)则居于其间。在正义战争理论的思想体系中,主要包括“开战正义”(jus ad bellum)和“交战正义”(jus in bello)两大分支。   就“开战正义”而言,它要求发动一场正义战争需满足正当理由、合法权威、正当动机、成功前景、适当比例与最后手段六个道德要件。在恐怖主义的暴力行为中,“伊斯兰国”组织鼓吹的“圣战”运动蓄意曲解了伊斯兰教的吉哈德(Jihad)观念,完全不符合正当理由与适当比例的基本原则,而严重背离了这一战争伦理。   就“交战正义”而言,它要求战争的参与者在作战中必须遵守“区别”(discrimination)与“比例相称”(proportionality)的规范性原则。前者强调禁止平民、伤员、战俘等非战斗人员的生命和财产在战争中被当作蓄意攻击的目标对象;后者强调即使在针对合法目标时,也不应滥用武力而造成超出军事目的所需的过度杀伤。不同于职业军人所参与的国家间战争行为,恐怖主义的武力使用本身几乎不遵守也不接受任何战争伦理的约束。   而这种突破伦理底线的暴力行为所带来的负面效果并不仅仅在于恐怖组织自身的暴虐行径所造成的直接影响,更在于其向其他非国家行为体的地区武装力量所进行的极端化的社会传染,甚至还使得国家行为体在反恐行动中也开始突破战争伦理的规范和约束。由此,武力行为所依据的传统伦理基础开始被这些政治单元的越线行为所日益侵蚀。   (三)创设替代政治秩序 与单纯发泄报复式的反社会行为不同,恐怖主义行为在其恐怖活动背后还有一套由特定的价值诉求和政治目标所构成的行为逻辑。“伊斯兰国”组织是其典型代表:一方面,“伊斯兰国”大肆挞伐并极力破坏当前的国际秩序;另一方面,又渴慕能够建立一个在其治下的替代性政治秩序。“伊斯兰国”扎根于伊斯兰教与伊斯兰社会而进行的政治秩序的创设实践主要分为两个方面。   第一,要求恢复“哈里发”政治制度。在传统伊斯兰文化中,并不存在现代意义上的民族国家主权观念。而在强调“信主独一”的伊斯兰政治哲学中,安拉是最高的主权拥有者。从这种“真主主权论”所衍生出的是“先知权威论”和“代行主权论”。由此,“哈里发”继承了“封印先知”在世间的职责,即管理穆斯林乌玛(Ummah)。   根据这样的逻辑,“哈里发”制度也就成为伊斯兰的基本政治制度。“伊斯兰国”利用和歪曲了这一历史和宗教基础,并通过“回归过去”(反对既有政治秩序以回归历史幻象)、“塑造现实”(“哈里发”的实体化)、“憧憬未来”(煽动“末日决战”与“哈里发帝国”扩张)三个有机统一的序贯逻辑,建构了所谓“国家”的意识形态和政治制度,并以此来树立自身的神权统治。   无论成败与好坏,这种对于神权政治极端化的复辟尝试都无疑向国际社会提供了一种替代性的政治方案和观念实践,从而对以主权国家为主体的国际体系造成了现实冲击。特别是对于伊斯兰神权秩序的信奉者来说,其更是具有现实的吸引力和可观的影响力。   第二,推行伊斯兰教法统治。为了恢复和施行全面的“沙里亚”(al-Sharia,即伊斯兰教法),“伊斯兰国”组织设立了沙里亚委员会(Sharia Council)的“国家”建制,并在此基础上建立了沙里亚教法秩序,从而以此为重要组成部分来进行国家统治和社会管理。在其治下,伊斯兰教法居于压倒先前世俗法律的绝对主导地位。虽然世人纷纷指责“伊斯兰国”组织推行的这种教法统治极尽严苛而惨无人道,更有断章取义之嫌,但是对于尊奉迷信沙里亚的信众来说,却是另当别论的,有的信徒甚至还明确表示对这种“复归”尝试感到欢欣鼓舞。   任何国际秩序的创设和发展都需要特定权力、制度和规范因素的充分保障,进而在相应权力强化、制度深化和规范内化的基础之上,国际秩序才得以稳定和持续。但是,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量却通过汲取权力、另设制度和重构规范的方式,对国际社会发展所依赖的意义系统和价值体系进行以重释再造为核心特征的社会解构。其行为虽不足以瓦解和颠覆当前的国际秩序,但却也在事实上日益侵蚀和消解着国际秩序的既有根基和总体信念。     二、恐怖主义的“木马”植入 “木马”除了字面含义外,又因人们熟知的古希腊神话《特洛伊战争》中的引申含义,即“害人的‘礼物’”(Greek Gift);在网络安全领域中,亦指一种计算机恶意代码和病毒程序(即木马病毒)。从木马的隐喻来看,主要暗含了“伪装”(不易甄别)、“潜入”(难以阻绝)和“破坏”(负面影响)三个循次步骤和构成要件。   恐怖主义的极端意识形态和激进暴力倾向使其难以被主流社会及其民众所认可和接受。同时,主流社会对于恐怖主义的政治宣传和行为活动也进行着严密监控和强力回击。因此,为了攻破这一牢固的政治防线,恐怖组织采用了“木马”植入的行为策略,主要通过向主流社会植入“恐怖袭击”“恐怖气氛”和“仇恨敌对”三种“木马病毒”,以此来破坏社会秩序、恶化社会环境和制造社会隔裂。   (一)动员恐怖袭击 作为一种极端的反动力量,恐怖主义要想“打入”主流社会就必须借助具体的人及其实践的极端行为。为此,恐怖主义“制造”了恐怖分子这种“人肉木马”,并通过动员恐怖袭击的方式寻求实现对于社会秩序的破坏和解构。这种“木马”植入主要分为诱发内部病变与进行外部移植两种方式。   第一,发展“独狼”分子。任何社会都不免存在结构失语人群与宗教狂热分子,他们被恐怖组织视为潜在的动员对象。恐怖组织首先在主流社会内部发现这些潜在的恐怖分子,并通过观念洗脑教育、暴力手段传播和地下支持网络途径将他们发展成为恐怖袭击分子。正是由于这样一种对于极端运动的参与体验和想象满足,使得“独狼”分子感到“独而不孤”。他们在恐怖组织的煽动和教唆下发生自我“病变”,对于一个健康的社会有机体来说,其无疑是来自内部的重大威胁。   第二,培训输出暴力。与发展“独狼”分子的内部动员相对照,培训输出暴力是恐怖组织进行外部动员的主要方式。   一方面,目前恐怖组织培训输出暴力以西亚北非为重点地区,该地区逗留着为数不少的“外国恐怖主义战斗人员”(foreign terrorist fighters)。他们从母国千里迢迢赶赴中东战场为恐怖组织效命。然而,随着“伊斯兰国”组织及其分支等恐怖主义力量面临战事接连不利乃至溃败,这些外籍恐怖分子在接受培训后,借助自己的国籍“优势”返回原在国家和地区,继续进行恐怖主义活动。此外,还有一些原本只是前来参战的“外籍战士”(foreign fighters)在参战过程中接受了恐怖组织的极端思想,并在返回原在国家和地区后开始从事恐怖主义活动。   另一方面,中东地区当地的一些恐怖分子还乔装为难民,通过偷渡或借难民收留得以潜入欧洲等地。借此,恐怖组织通过将这些外籍人员和伪装难民等“木马”植入当地社会,而蓄谋借此发动恐怖袭击而完成暴力输出。   对于主流社会来说,应对“木马”植入颇为棘手:一方面,这些恐怖分子在发动恐怖袭击前利用自己的“身份优势”进行自我隐蔽而不易甄别;另一方面,此类恐怖主义袭击的行为目标、发动时间和地点选择的随机性也较强,作案手段相对简单,仅仅是通过持刀或驾车便可作案,这些都无疑加重了当地安全部门在情报和安保工作上的负荷和成本。   更为严重的是,它还导致安全部门陷入一种自我循环强化的两难局面:一旦有所松懈便面临更为严峻的反恐压力,但加强警戒和提升防备又将导致安保人员的疲于奔命以及承担代价不菲的安保支出。因此,作为一种社会解构力量,恐怖组织成功地借助恐怖分子这种“木马病毒”干扰了主流社会的安全秩序和社会稳定。   (二)滋长恐怖气氛 安全状态由安全环境和安全感知两个部分构成和形塑,前者主要指客观上没有实际威胁,后者主要指主观上无威胁感。恐怖主义对于国际安全所造成的冲击和挑战就源于其在国际社会滋长了一种复合了客观实际与主观认知的恐怖气氛,主要包括加剧安全威胁与激发不安全感两个方面。   第一,加剧安全威胁。对于恐怖组织来说,其显然难以与国家在军事安全议题上分庭抗礼,但其却能在民事安全议题上寻衅滋事。恐怖组织分别通过瞄准“硬目标”(特定目标)和“软目标”(随机目标),实施相应的象征性暴力和无差别暴力,制造并加剧主流社会所面临的安全威胁,进而在社会环境中成功地滋生出一种恐怖氛围。根据美国战略与国际问题研究中心的调查显示,对于恐怖袭击的忧惧已经成为世界各地民众目前最重要的安全关切之一。   第二,激发不安全感。安全感(safety feeling)是指人在受到保护或摆脱危险情境时所体验到的情感。相应地,不安全感则是指人在面对(潜在)威胁或风险时所体验到的情感。透过对于安全威胁加剧的亲身经历或媒体报道,公众开始意识到政府的安保漏洞和自身的涉险处境,从而产生恐惧惊慌的情绪体验和不安全感。同时,这种负面情绪还会相互传染和彼此强化,并严重影响群体和个体的行为选择。此外,对于安全感的解构与建构还呈现出明显的不对称性:前者往往比后者来得更为容易和迅速。由此,也在客观上助长了恐怖主义所滋生的恐怖氛围。恐怖组织正是利用这一点,在暴力袭击后鼓噪各种骇人听闻的极端言辞,并扬言要制造更大规模的暴力事件。   恐怖主义在本质上属于一种恐惧政治,即通过引发人们的恐惧情绪以实现自身的政治目标。诚如丹尼尔·德雷兹内(Daniel W. Drezner)所言,恐惧是一种强有力的情绪,它可以在多重维度上深刻地影响政策的制定。除了政客利用恐怖政治之外,恐怖组织同样借助恐怖向主流社会植入恐怖气氛的“木马病毒”,从而得以催生和传染社会恐慌,进而影响和恶化社会环境。   (三)催生仇恨敌对 在制造恐怖袭击和鼓噪恐怖气氛的基础上,恐怖组织塑造和实践了自身的身份政治(identity politics),从而实现对同情分子的笼络和蛊惑以及对支持分子的巩固和强化。恐怖主义的身份政治主要分为两种交错递进的演进逻辑: (1)去身份化与认同解构; (2)再身份化与认同重构。   其中,前者主要是颠覆和解构目标对象所习得和内化的身份认同,后者则是在此基础上植入和重构新的更为激进和极端的自我归属。两者交互作用后,恐怖组织一方面不断强化自身的认同边界,另一方面则不断侵蚀和消解目标对象的认同边界。恐怖组织在其身份政治中进行“解构-重构”的复合实践,其目标是制造主体区隔和引致冲突关系。   第一,鼓动排他敌对。包容(inclusivity)与排斥(exclusivity)是社会互动的两种基本取向:前者主张主体之间的沟通与交流、包容与并蓄,它是多元的、外向化的社会关系;后者则强调自我与他者、内群与外群的差异与壁垒,它是单一的、内向化的社会关系。   对于恐怖主义来说,它一方面对前者完全否定,另一方面则将后者进一步极端化,即通过封闭互动空间而将其所划分的差异主体进行隔绝,进而借由自我肯定和价值排他而将这种差异对立起来,最终实现两者之间的相互排斥和敌意螺旋。由此,原本可以在尊重彼此差异的基础上进行“间谈”的社会主体,通过这种他者化(otherization)甚至是非人化(dehumanization)而被消解和贬低为不能够对话、只能被消灭的行为对象。   第二,煽动仇恨暴力。鼓动排他敌对是在认知框架上实现了主体关系的冲突化,煽动仇恨暴力则进一步完成了这种负面观念的实践化。恐怖主义的这种“观念-实践”嫁接主要分为“提供目标→提供方案→提供支持”三个步骤: 首先,进行以时间为线索的对抗性叙事,通过在此基础上的选择性对照和戏剧化比较,从而制造落差感、屈辱感和被剥夺感,并将之归咎于目标对象所为。 其次,排除日常的和平解决方案,夸大暴力手段的效能并以所谓“正当性”来粉饰其负面性。 再次,为仇恨暴力实践提供物质和精神支持。   由此,原本就存在的敌对认知进一步获得了相应的行为动能,并通过这种极端暴力的方式进而导致观念与实践之间的相互强化。   由此可见,恐怖主义的“木马”植入策略在催生仇恨敌对时采取的是双重手段:一方面,它把更加极端和更有暴力倾向的观念植入个体,从而吞噬其既有的个人身份认同;另一方面,它又将更为激进和更具侵略性的观念植入群体而瓦解其既有的社会身份认同。与此同时,这种社会解构的持续发酵还将“绑架”社会群体中的温和派,并进一步导致单方仇视演变为双向敌对的共同激进化,从而制造更大规模的社会隔裂。     三、恐怖主义的反向利用 在人类的社会活动中,工具与价值是一对相辅相成的概念:工具性为价值性提供了实现手段,价值性则为工具性指明了存在意义。与此同时,同一价值目标可以通过不同的工具手段实现,而同一工具方式的意义也可以映射不同的存在价值。就前者而言,主流社会为了实现公序良俗的共同目标综合使用了政治、经济、文化等不同工具;就后者而言,这些工具除了服务于主流社会的价值目标之外,还为恐怖组织等社会力量所反向利用,以实现其自身特定的价值目标。以“伊斯兰国”组织为例,其对于主流社会所熟知工具的反向利用表现为“黑色经济”“黑色宣传”与“黑色技术”三个方面。   (一)黑色经济 生产、分配、交换和消费是经济活动的四个基本环节。一般来说,正常的经济活动主要是通过这四个环节来实现改善人民生活水平、提升社会整体福利的价值目标。但是,恐怖主义的“经济活动”则是为了筹措恐怖经费、服务暴力输出。不同于以往恐怖组织主要依靠私人捐赠、宗教基金会等“输血式”的经济来源,“伊斯兰国”组织通过“政府”、市场和社会三个层面的经济动员,实现了“造血式”的经济自足。这一恐怖主义力量在主流社会经济系统中的反向利用以生产环节和交换环节最为典型。   第一,黑色生产。为了满足日常生活的市场需求、维护自身治下的社会秩序以及保证持续稳定的资金来源,“伊斯兰国”组织一旦攻取新的领土,就立马着手控制、继承和接管当地的道路等基础设施、燃气和电力系统,并在既有的经济发展基础上组织或强迫当地民众继续进行小麦、棉花、原油等主要产品的农业和工业生产活动。   第二,黑色交换。由于“伊斯兰国”组织难以在其“境内”实现自给自足,因而必须通过对外经济往来以满足其贸易和金融需求。一方面,石油是“伊斯兰国”组织最重要的贸易产品,其为此还建立了自身石油输出的利益链,从而攫取巨额的能源财富;另一方面,“伊斯兰国”组织还借助地下钱庄和私人外汇交易所建立了自身的地下金融网络,以此来寻求躲避国际社会的金融制裁。正是由于资本具有逐利性,恐怖主义才得以讽刺般地刺破自由主义-资本主义的“双身”结构,进而反向利用其伪善。   虽然“伊斯兰国”组织在经济管理方面罔顾价值规律、滥施苛捐杂税、违背商业精神,无疑是一个失败的“经理人”。但换个角度看,即使“伊斯兰国”组织始终难以逃脱规模有限、脆弱动荡又缺乏潜力的经济命运,我们还是得承认这一恐怖主义力量的确在事实上反向利用了各种经济手段,为自身的能力建设和组织发展攫取了可观的物质财富。另外同样值得注意的是,虽然国际社会在经济生产和金融贸易方面的摧毁性打击对“伊斯兰国”组织的经济体系造成了致命性影响,但是就发动相对较低成本的对外恐怖袭击而言,这一恐怖组织仍然拥有相对富余的资金来应对国际社会在经济领域的联合绞杀。   (二)黑色宣传 宣传是一种重要的信息传播行为,它可以有效地塑造受众的认知行为、动员潜在的支持对象、扩大自身的声望影响。一般来说,正常的宣传活动主要是为了实现争取民众支持(政治宣传)、增加消费行为(商业宣传)等主流社会所允许和接纳的目标和效果。但是,恐怖主义的“宣传活动”却是通过传播恐怖暴力和动员极端分子来扩大组织影响和威慑主流社会。具体来说,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖主义力量,对于主流社会宣传工具的反向利用主要包括在新媒体的复合宣传和与传统媒体的“利益共谋”。   第一,复合宣传。“伊斯兰国”组织借由手机、电脑等传播媒介,并依托视频网站、社交媒体等信息平台建立了自身庞大的新媒体宣传网络。在此基础上,通过图片、视频、文字、声音等信息形式进行了针对多重对象、多重目标的复合宣传:一方面,“伊斯兰国”组织对于其欲争取和发展的潜在动员对象,进行了以宗教狂热和极端政治为主要内容的激进化宣传;另一方面,“伊斯兰国”组织针对其欲恐吓和威慑的主流社会人群,进行了以骇人听闻的言辞和暴力实践为主要内容的恐怖化宣传。由此,开放结构、民主精神、全球互动等线上文化的核心要素却反向成为恐怖主义自由行动的客观助益。   第二,“利益共谋”。商业化的媒体发展本质上遵循“注意力经济”(attention economy)的盈利原则。也就是说,越是那些能够博人关注、吸引眼球的信息,越会带来更高的流量(包括浏览量和话题量),进而越能创造更大的新闻影响力。由于恐怖主义事件往往能够激发受众的更为强烈的感官刺激和更加紧迫的安全关切,因而也就成为传统媒体集中报道的对象。这恰恰也被恐怖组织所反向利用:其所制造的暴力事件经主流媒体过度报道(密集频率与过度渲染)之后,往往会产生关于恐怖组织符号暴力的二次输出效果。正是在这一点上,传统媒体与恐怖组织形成了一种“利益共谋”的“合作关系”。   黑色宣传在本质上反映出恐怖主义对于媒介运作的反向利用。古往今来,真实的暴力总是“易逝”的,人们对于暴力所产生的恐怖记忆往往会随着时间和代际的更迭而被渐渐淡隐。但是,恐怖组织却别有用心地通过以图像、影像等“仿象技术”的记录方式,从而将其制造的恐怖暴力的政治剩余价值符号化,进而将暴力的符号变为符号的暴力。   这种做法的本质正如让·波德里亚(Jean Baudrillard)所揭示的,对真实的精细复制不是从真实本身开始,而从另一种复制性中介开始。在这个复制过程的终点,真实不仅是那个可以再现的东西,而且是那个永远已经再现的东西:超真实(hyper-reality)。在此基础上,恐怖组织通过对于传统媒介和新兴媒介所具有的符号性储存功能的反向利用,得以突破物理时空的界限,从而进行持续的恐慌制造和恐怖动员。   (三)黑色技术 技术是创造新的可能世界的根本原因,其对人类社会的价值和意义不言而喻。从刀剑斧钺到枪弹箭炮、从蒸汽电力到信息智能,举凡重大的社会变革,背后无不有着技术发展的支撑和助力。技术因素本身也存在技术异化和黑色技术两重负面影响:前者是指技术对人的物化和反噬,后者是指技术沦为犯罪作恶的工具和手段。恐怖组织通过反向利用既有的技术成果,往往会对主流社会的发展与安全造成巨大的威胁和破坏,其中以核生化恐怖主义(nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism/NBC terrorism)和网络恐怖主义(cyberterrorism)最为典型。   第一,核生化恐怖主义。由于核子、生物与化学武器一旦使用将会对公众健康和生态环境造成巨大破坏,因而国际社会一直致力于削减和销毁这些武器,各国政府也对核生化技术及相关材料的传播和使用保持高度警惕和进行严格控制。然而,为图谋实现更有杀伤力的恐怖袭击,恐怖组织和极端分子目前主要通过盗窃、走私和私制等方式来获得大规模杀伤性武器,从而蓄谋发动更具社会危害性的核生化恐怖袭击。   从东京地铁沙林毒气事件到格罗兹尼氯气罐爆炸案,核生化恐怖主义袭击一直是人类社会技术发展背后挥之不去的安全阴影。从1950年到2005年,全球累计发生了423起“化生放核”(化学、生物、放射性、核,Chemical,Biological,Radioactive and Nuclear/CBRN)袭击事件。核生化武器与恐怖主义袭击的致命结合将会急剧增加国际安全面临的潜在威胁和实际挑战。   第二,网络恐怖主义。随着互联网技术的兴起和发展,网络平台的推广和使用在便利人们日常生活的同时,也增加了网络用户被恶意攻击、窃取资料和侵犯隐私等种种安全风险。对于恐怖组织来说,它们一方面试图通过网络攻击来对目标对象进行打击报复(目标型网络恐怖主义),另一方面则积极借助网络平台进行经费筹措、情报搜集、人员招募和复合宣传(工具型网络恐怖主义)。与此同时,恐怖组织对于网络技术和网络平台的反向利用并不仅仅局限于“明网”(clearnet),而是将触角伸向更为隐秘和疏于监管的“暗网”(dark web)。   目前,恐怖分子的“暗网”活动主要包括进行虚拟金融活动、内部秘密联络、反追踪地下宣传、组织隐匿动员等多个方面。由此,随着网络技术开始成为恐怖主义反向利用的新武器,网络空间也相应地就成为国际社会反恐行动的新战场。   通过对经济发展、媒体宣传与技术使用等基本社会活动的嵌入和寄生,以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的恐怖组织一方面力图突出、利用和强化这些活动方式背后的工具属性,另一方面则寻求否定、剥离和解构这些活动方式在主流社会所暗含的价值属性。由此,恐怖主义在社会活动的工具手段与价值规范之间,找到了自身存续所得以凭借的反向利用空间。     四、应对恐怖主义的社会解构 当前,国际社会对于恐怖主义威胁的应对主要表现为螺旋交错的双重逻辑。   其中,内向的防御逻辑突出预防恐怖主义,意在增强国际社会对于恐怖主义渗透的抵御能力,包括构筑情报预警网络、升级安保监控水平、培育健全公民人格、深化社会经济建设、管控边境人口流动等方式; 外向的进攻逻辑强调打击恐怖主义,旨在削弱恐怖主义活动对国际社会的破坏能力,包括建立应急反应体系、协调武装军事行动、加强金融制裁措施、打击恐怖组织及其分支等内容。   在这种双重逻辑的交互作用下,国际社会逐渐摸索出一条强盾战略与利矛战略相互结合的反恐路径。沿着这一思路,对于恐怖主义的社会解构,国际社会的应对举措在宏观上可以分为逆向战略、话语修正和系统联通三个方面。   (一)加强反恐实践中的逆向战略 恐怖主义的本质在于通过近乎狂热的极端思想以及在此怂恿下的无差别暴力行为来制造恐慌并以此来实现自身特定的政治目标。由此可见,恐怖主义与主流社会存在客观的政治竞争。正因如此,恐怖主义才寻求通过对于价值意义的重释再造来侵蚀消解主流社会的政治根基。作为因应,国际社会在回击这一解构挑战的过程中,需要加强反恐实践中的逆向战略。   首先,与恐怖主义的政治主张展开绩效竞争。任何政治主张的价值证成最终都需要落实为实践绩效。也就是说,一种在实践上低效甚至失败的政治主张自然会丧失其所宣扬的合理价值。既然恐怖主义意图解构主流社会中的边界政治、生命伦理和秩序架构,那么国际社会就可以一方面强化这些政治安排在现实生活中的实际意义和存在价值,另一方面则通过遏制战略压缩和削弱恐怖主义所谓的政治实践的空间和效能,最终使恐怖组织的政治主张失去观念市场。   其次,对恐怖主义的意识形态加强反向叙事(counter-narrative)。以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的宗教极端主义惯以宗教话语为自身的政治逻辑提供合法性。因此,国际社会在反恐实践中的平行叙事并不足以遏制恐怖主义意识形态的恶性扩散,而有必要就恐怖主义所片面采择的文本和价值依据进行针锋相对的逐一批驳。例如,《古兰经》和圣训就强调中正平衡,反对极端暴虐。对于这些观念价值的挖掘和弘扬显然有助于有效削弱恐怖主义意识形态的基础和传播。   与此同时,反恐行动中有效的反向叙事除了在逻辑和文本上的工作之外,还需相应地以具体实践为支撑,从而避免反向叙事流于空谈而经受不住实践检验。例如,国际社会的反恐实践在强调自身对于当地稳定可以发挥建设性作用的同时,还需要切实推动当地的经济建设和社会发展,从而防止单纯注重安全议题而变向印证恐怖组织和极端主义政治叙事中的外来入侵和陷落危机而掉入其话语陷阱。   再次,锐意革除反恐政治中的沉疴积弊。任何恐怖主义的逆势生长都绝非偶然、孤立的政治事件,而是一种对于反恐政治中沉疴积弊的变向反映。为此,反恐实践中的逆向战略对象不仅包括外在的恐怖主义的意识形态,还应涵盖内在的反恐政治的价值体系。例如,由于某些国家在反恐政治中就恐怖主义认定、反恐治理方式和国际反恐合作等问题持有双重标准,因而在客观上为一些恐怖组织的坐大变向提供了政治土壤。对此,国际社会要坚决反对以任何政治、民族和宗教理由庇护和纵容恐怖分子。   (二)修正反恐叙事中的敌意话语 主流社会始终面临恐怖主义“木马”植入危险的根本原因在于,我们一方面无法化解来自外部的敌对,另一方面难以阻绝来自内部的分化。因而,在“内敌-外敌”的叙事结构和话语框架下,我们就难免深陷腹背受敌的双向敌意困境。因此,为了消弭恐怖主义所带来的原生危害(如恐惧)和衍生问题(如仇恨),国际社会需要进一步修正反恐叙事中的敌意话语。   首先,对外化敌为友,进行广泛争取。虽然我们经常对恐怖分子及其组织做整体认知,但是极端组织内部并非就是铁板一块和高度同质化的。然而,诸如“敌人刑法”等建立在敌人话语叙事基础上的社会建制,却将那些原本可以被挽回的对象进行绝对隔离并与其永久对立,从而反倒助长和固化了这种政治冲突。   需要认识到,即使是在反恐政治中,也绝不存在不能被争取的“敌人”和无法被化解的敌意。问题的关键在于如何实现温和化和去激进化,而非在能否实现的问题上迷走打转。与此同时,反恐叙事还需要防止将恐怖主义同特定的国家、民族和宗教挂钩,从而导致反恐行动的蓄意扩大化和过度安全化。   其次,对内深化团结,加强有机联系。社会联系分为机械联系与有机联系,前者只是物理上的维系和连接,后者则是心理上的关系与联结。恐怖主义得以在主流社会内部进行大众动员的一个重要条件就是,特定个体或群体虽然在物理上与当地的主流社会保持着机械联系,但是在心理上却是被边缘和隔绝的对象,是“内居的外人”,因而只能寻求通过外部世界来满足自身建立有机联系的社会需求,恐怖组织的恐怖动员正是利用了这种需求,并借此实现对于动员的极端化和暴力塑造。因此,对于反恐叙事的话语修正不仅包括对外的化敌为友,而且还需要对内的团结深化。   进行广泛争取的化敌为友与加强有机联系的深化团结的行为可以分为消极和积极两个维度。在消极方面,主要包括反区别化、反对立化和反冲突化三个循次递进的组成部分: 第一,避免人为界别和夸大群内差异。 第二,防止群内差异激化为次群之间的排斥对立。 第三,抑制次群对立演变为同化和除异的冲突化实践。在积极方面,主要包括交互作用的两条路径:扭转敌对(纠正误解和增进理解)和稀释敌对(发展关系联结和引入积极第三方)。   (三)联通反恐治理中的不同系统 当代恐怖主义反向利用主流社会基本活动的根本条件是现代社会功能分化系统的负外部性。正是得益于此,恐怖组织才将现代世界的逻辑变为恐怖主义的架构,从而完成部落主义与全球主义的逻辑异轨。因此,为了制止恐怖主义的这种恶意滥用,国际社会需要在反恐治理中加强不同功能系统之间的串联相通。   由于每一个系统都有和其他系统不同的环境,并有其自身的运作方式,因而在一个无中心的、彻底功能分化的社会中,没有哪个系统可以宣称是最基本的系统,任何一个系统也都是不可或缺的,更没有哪一个系统的符码可以被认为是元符码(meta-code)而放之各个系统皆准,故而诸系统不可能基于某一共同的区分而被整合起来。由此,如果想要实现不同系统在反恐治理上的相互协调,就需要以价值架桥的方式来加强不同系统之间的互联互通。   在反恐治理的实践进程中,需要通过在不同的社会系统中重建强化既有的规范预设,继而为系统内部的媒介(media)和符码(code)辅之以价值向度,从而将恐怖主义欲图解构的意义附着悉数锚定,从而以系统内部自我约束的自律沟通以及系统之间相互制衡的他律沟通,防止出现在政治系统中与恐怖主义权力互构的暴力政治、在法律系统借反恐之名肆意扩张的劣规恶律、在宗教系统与恐怖主义信仰联结的极端主义、在媒体系统与恐怖主义利益共谋的无良宣传、在科技系统为服务恐怖主义而进行知识转移的学术败坏、在经济系统中与恐怖组织共敛不义之财等“恐怖互利”的系统结果,进而遏制由于分化社会系统与恐怖主义力量之间彼此变向利用与反向利用而对国际社会所造成的价值基础坍塌和意义体系崩解。     五、结论:竞争态势感知的塑造 恐怖主义作为一种寻求实现某种政治信念的极端策略并不时新,它通过不同的政治变种鬼魅地萦绕在人类社会发展演进的历史脉络之中。同时,恐怖主义对于意义体系进行消解侵蚀的社会解构也在时代更迭的嬗变过程中如影随形并不断翻新。当前,随着以“伊斯兰国”组织为代表的宗教恐怖主义和暴力极端主义对于主流社会意义体系的侵蚀消解和冲击动摇,国际社会面临着既有国际秩序出现价值失重的风险挑战,因而需要我们对此进行反思和因应。   飘风不终朝,骤雨不终日。一时的军事高压或许可以暂解恐怖主义肆虐的燃眉之急,但此举毕竟难以持久;尤其是对于恐怖主义的社会解构来说,武力之法恐难以刚克柔。因此,国际社会更为根本的战略应对在于重构反恐时代的意义体系。对于恐怖组织来说,它通过一种逼近认知和行为极限的方式扭曲地折射出自身的观念世界。但是,作为一种难以兼容他者的极端政治,恐怖主义在解构与重构的联结转换中存在着根本的断裂,因而始终无法成为一种有效的建构力量。   对于国际社会来说,反恐治理的要义在于促进去极端化而非与恐怖主义进行相互强化的敌我战争。因此,作为对于恐怖主义社会解构的战略因应,未来世界秩序的构建将是一种在本质上的意义重塑。在这一次秩序重建的过程中,我们必须直面和正视那些原先在我们的意义体系中价值孤悬的政治信念,并进一步引导和激励其支持者以主流社会所能接受的方式进行诉求表达。  

  • BIOSECURITY AND PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

    BIOSECURITY AND PAKISTAN: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal Abstract The biological threats have been arising from both natural and man-made pathogens. Indeed, the dual-use characteristic of biological research increases the chances of its misuse. The biological research dissemination, however, could not be banned because of the immense use of biological agents in human medicines, veterinary prosperity, and agriculture productivity. The benevolent and malevolent use of biological sciences intensifies the significance of Biosecurity. Despite its importance, Biosecurity receives inconsequential attention in Pakistan. The focus on Biosecurity in Pakistan is not much different from other developing countries. The people of Pakistan are vulnerable to Biosecurity related challenges. The complex nature of Biosecurity challenges and underscores that no nation and no institution is capable to deal with them on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities of like Introduction The revolution in biological-sciences and biological- technology signifies Biosecurity in the twenty-first century. 1 Biosecurity is often interchangeably used or confused with Bio-safety. The concepts of Bio-safety and Biosecurity deal with related, but distinctly different puzzles. Bio-safety is a well-established concept with a widely-accepted meaning and international guidance on how it is put into practice at the national level. 2 The Bio-safety measures aim to prevent the unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. 3 The term Biosecurity is a comparatively new one, and thereby its’ concept has been evolving. Since 2003, in the setting of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 2 Convention (BTWC), Biosecurity has most commonly been used to refer to the mechanisms that establish and maintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms, toxins and relevant resources. 4 Hence, Biosecurity protects germs from people. And its measures focus on the prevention of theft, misuse, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins. 5 Today, however, the Biosecurity scope is broader than the BTWC delineation. The impressive advancements in biotechnology or rapid advances in genetic engineering and the study of pathogenesis (the molecular mechanisms by which microbes cause disease) alarm that terrorists’ could be able to create “improved” bio- warfare agents for their nefarious objectives. The ability of scientists to produce life from scratch provides an option to the terrorist group to synthesize deadly pathogens having greater lethality, environmental stability, difficulty of detection, and resistance to existing drugs and vaccines. Jonathan B. Tucker pointed out: “The efficient dispersal of a few kilograms of a biological agent, such as the dried spores of the anthrax bacterium, over a troop concentration or a major city could sicken or kill many thousands of people.” 6 Tucker’s anxiety about biological agents was shared by numerous security observers, who believed that “Biotechnology is one of the two technologies that truly deserve the label ‘agent of mass destruction’ and it is by far the more accessible of the two.” 7 Tucker also pointed out that: “the limited quantities of biological agent required for a devastating attack could be produced with small-scale equipment, occupying perhaps only a single room, and nearly all such equipment is dual-use and available throughout the world.” 8 The dual-use phenomenon added a subverting variable in the Biosecurity. In simple words, a scientists or laboratory technician can steal a small quantity of dangerous pathogens and use it to develop biological weapon himself or pass it onto a terrorist group for monetary or even ideological reasons. 9 Although, the bioterrorism centralized Biosecurity debate, especially after the anthrax use in fall 2001, yet it has kept the discourse within the traditional security paradigm. The Severe Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 3 Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) contagion in 2002- 2003, 10 Influenza A virus epidemic of 2006 (avian influenza), 2007 Equine influenza, 2009 Swine flu and again the Swine flu pandemic outbreak in India in December 2014, 11 have alarmed security analysts. Consequently, Biosecurity has emerged as an important area of investigation for the Human Security analysts in the developed world. Conversely, bioterrorism, emerging diseases (SARS) or reemerging infectious disease (tuberculosis, plague) and pandemic flu strains, which are all within the context of rapid global travel, have failed to draw serious response in the developing states. The focus on Biosecurity in Pakistan is not much different from the other developing states. The people of Pakistan are vulnerable to the Biosecurity related challenges. It was reported that on April 14, 2015, a 57-year-old man died in Lahore after allegedly contracting swine flu. 12 On May 8, 2015, a person died in Islamabad due to Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). 13 Three deaths caused by Naegleria fowleri, commonly known as the ‘brain-eating’ amoeba, in Karachi during the first half of 2015. 14 Around 500 camels infected by ‘mysterious disease’ in Noorpur Thal (District Khushab-Punjab) and adjoining areas in May 2015. 15 Despite the government of Pakistan’s serious efforts, Polio remains endemic disease in the country. 16 Today, “Pakistan is far away from target set by WHO and we failed to completely eradicate polio from Pakistan. 17 According to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI), four sanctuaries for the polio virus exist in Pakistan, i.e. Quetta, the districts of Qila Abdullah and Pishin and Karachi. 18 The mosquito borne diseases are common in Pakistan. For example, in 2011, Dengue caused havoc in Lahore. 19 The foot- and-mouth (FMD—a pathogen of cattle and other ungulates) disease is very common in the rural areas of Pakistan. 20 The common man live stocks in the rural areas of the country suffered immensely from this disease. Similarly, Pakistani agriculture sector, especially citrus and mango growing regions are sufferer of diseases affecting the trees and plants. The citrus greening, caused by the bacteria Liberibacter Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 4 asiaticus 21 takes its toll on the productivity of the citrus. The mango growers’ economy severely affected during the recent years, especially in District Multan and Sind province. The repetition of the diseases reflects the poor management of Biosecurity in Pakistan. The objective of this study is to critically examine the Biosecurity’s puzzles. The key research questions are: What is meant by Biosecurity? What is the Spectrum of the Biosecurity threat? What are the alarming facts? What is the situation in Pakistan? The answers of these questions assist us in chalking out the appropriate countermeasures to redress the Biosecurity challenges in the twenty-first century. The first section contains discussion on the theoretical contextualization. It is followed by securitization of Biosecurity phenomenon. The third section briefly highlights the spectrum of biological threats. The fourth section deliberates about Pakistan and Biosecurity. The fifth section contains discussion on the Biosecurity related challenges to Pakistan. The final section contains countermeasures. Theoretical Contextualization The Traditional and Non-Traditional security theorists have been critically examining the significant issues like bio- risks, bio-safety, and bio-security that impinge on daily human existence and welfare. In the traditional security paradigm, the BTWC prevents biological warfare and the deliberate use of disease as a weapon. The Convention, however, has failed to eradicate the stocks of Biological weapons completely, because of the absence of verification and enforcement mechanism. The Convention also could not dissuade the use of Biological agents by the local, national and international terrorist groups for their nefarious objectives in the prevailing asymmetrical warfare. The Non-Traditional Security school of thought warned that the entire world has been gradually inching towards bio- insecurity. While discussing current non-traditional security threats, Mely Caballero-Anthony pointed out: “Aside from Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 5 being non-military in nature, these challenges share other common characteristics: they are transnational in scope (neither purely domestic nor purely inter-state); they arise at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly as a result of globalization and the communication revolution; they cannot be prevented entirely, but can be mitigated through coping mechanisms; national solutions are often inadequate, and thus regional and multilateral cooperation is essential; and finally, the object of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty and territorial integrity) but also the people — their survival, well-being and dignity, at both individual and societal level.” 22 This understanding of non-traditional security challenges underscores that infectious disease, such as the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), the H5N1- Bird flu virus, etc, have the capacity to detrimentally affect national security. The non-traditional security theorists also pointed out that Biosecurity of a state is very much vulnerable to the atmospheric changes due to natural calamity and man-made environmental degrading agents and population growth. The state’s national policies for food security and scientific inventions for the comfortability of citizens have serious repercussions for global atmospheric system. In spite of this, people have non-serious approach towards Biosecurity and therefore, the link between combating biological weapons and combating infectious diseases has not yet been established. This raises a question: how real is the threat? More precisely, demographic change, climate change, economic growth and the rising demand for resources have all posed serious threat to Biosecurity. Hence, there is a need to prevent, deter and deal with the threat of Biosecurity. Securitization of Biosecurity The rise of Non-Traditional security concept and asymmetric warfare pattern in the inter-state and intra-state theaters have signified Biosecurity puzzle in the post-Cold War security calculus. 23 Laura A. Meyerson and Jamie K. Reaser argued that: “Imported goods and animals can harbor Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 6 undetected species such as microbial pathogens, arthropods, or plant seeds with the potential to become invasive and cause significant harm.” 24 The U.S. anthrax attacks in 2001 and revelations about al Qaeda’s attempts to develop a Biological Weapons (BW) program alarmed the policymakers, particularly Bush Administration in the United States about the Biosecurity imbroglio. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks argued: “Even before the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, there was a growing understanding within the security and global health communities that pathogens pose a threat equal to, if not greater than, military might. Biological weapons offer a relatively inexpensive and surreptitious method of inflicting mass casualties.” 25 Notwithstanding, the term Biosecurity was originally used to describe an approach designed to prevent or decrease the spread of naturally occurring infectious diseases and pests in crops and livestock. The approach’s primary concern was the threats to animal and plant health and to biodiversity, which might have an indirect impact on human health, but not direct effect. More precisely, in veterinary and agricultural fields the term denoted protecting biological resources from foreign or invasive species. In the late 1990s, the threat of bioterrorism gave a new definition to Biosecurity. In this context, Biosecurity is defined as “the protection of microbial (bacteria causing diseases) agents from loss, theft, diversion or intentional use.” 26 During the last decade, the scholars having multidisciplinary background had intensively debated the concept of Biosecurity. The primary objective of the debate was to ensure the physical security of a designated list of dangerous pathogens. Consequently, Biosecurity definition has become more explicit and its focus has been broadened. 27 Since, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) conclusion (in August 2008) that Bruce Ivins, a scientist at the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), was the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letters attack, greater attention has been paid to ensure the reliability of personnel with access to microbial agents. 28 Bruce Ivins terrorism act had further intensified the significance of both protection of microbial and dual-use Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 7 biotechnology from scientists’ intentional misuse. This introduced a comprehensive perspective of Biosecurity. For instance, the United States National Academy of Science defined Biosecurity as: “security against the inadvertent, inappropriate, or intentional malicious or malevolent use of potentially dangerous biological agents or biotechnology, including the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons as well as outbreaks of newly emergent and epidemic disease.” 29 While discussion the National Academy of Science definition of Biosecurity Gregory D. Koblentz pointed out that: “This definition is characterized by the inclusion of both deliberate and natural sources of disease outbreaks, the threats posed by pathogens as well as biotechnology, and the vulnerability of humans, plants, and animals to biological threats.” 30 This understanding of Biosecurity necessitated the protection of germs from people. So that; an individual or a group could not steal, misuse, or intentional release the pathogens and toxins. 31 The Americans realization of the intensity of biological related threats contributed positively in the Biosecurity debate. In the aftermath of 2001 Anthrax letter attacks, the Biosecurity has become one of the primary security concerns in the United States. Its’ National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity while keeping in consideration the oversight of dual-use research, warned that a “biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to public health and/or national security.” 32 It has broadened the scope of Biosecurity beyond the pathogenic organisms that were the focus of previous definitions to include techniques and technologies that can be used to create new pathogenic organisms or biologically active compounds. Although dual-use characteristic of biological research increases the chances of misuse, yet its dissemination cannot be prohibited due to the use of biological agents in human medicine, veterinary prosperity, and agriculture productivity. Moreover, under the Article I of the BTWC States Parties are authorized to acquire and manipulate pathogens for Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 8 protective, prophylactic (refers activities related to the protection of the human body from the effects of organisms or substances to which an individual might be directly exposed) and other peaceful purposes. Such activities include biological defense programs. The dissemination and legitimate biological defense programs increase the probability of biological attacks; boost emergence and re-emergence of biological diseases, and also make difficult to distinguish legitimate from illicit research and development activities. Though, the Australia Group controls or limits the export of materials and technologies relevant to the production of chemical and biological weapons to proliferant countries as well as non-state actors, such as terrorists, 33 yet this control apparatus is inconclusive. The dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research and biological weapons production, and the global expansion of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors undermine the effectiveness of Australia Group export controls mechanism. Realizing the loopholes in Australia Group controlling system; the United States executed ‘Patriot Act of 2001 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002’, which criminalized the unauthorized possession, use, or transfer of the forty-nine biological agents or toxins listed by HHS. Individuals working with these agents must register with HHS and institute access controls, handling and reporting requirements, and personnel screening for their laboratories. 34 Despite these arrangements; Biosecurity remains vulnerable to acute risks. The dual applications of Chimeric Organism, Synthetic Biology, Synthetic Genomics, Molecular Biology, Bioregulators, and Genomic sciences or the “new biology” could be misused to undermine Biosecurity. Spectrum of Biological Threats The preceding section underscores the biological threats arising from natural or man-made pathogen. It identifies factors that pose challenge to Biosecurity and draws our attention to the reality that there is a broad array of biological Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 9 threats, natural as well as deliberate. It marked the risk that misuse of the life sciences could result in the deliberate or inadvertent release of biological material in a manner that sickens or kills people, animals, or plants, or renders unusable critical resources. The following table explains the spectrum of biological risks, ranging from natural occurring factious disease to deliberate use of disease as a weapon. Spectrum of Biological Threats Naturally occurring diseases Resurrect infectious diseases Unintended consequences of research Laboratory incidents Lack of awareness Negligence Deliberate misuse Source: Terence Taylor, “Safeguarding Advances in the Life Sciences,” EMBO Reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (July 2006), p. S61.http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1490302 /pdf/7400725.pdf, accessed on September 15, 2010. Biosecurity and Pakistan Pakistan has developed a modest bioscience and biotechnological infrastructure. It is a debatable variable that whether or not Islamabad is sensitive to the gravity of Biosecurity challenges. Nevertheless, Islamabad has taken a few constructive measures, which generate impression that the Government of Pakistan has not entirely insensitive to the Biosecurity quandary. For instance, Pakistan is party to BTWC and Convention on Biodiversity. It is signatory to the 2001 Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, 35 and had promulgated a national legislation entitled, Export Control on Goods, Technologies, Material and Equipment related to Nuclear and Biological Weapons and their Delivery Systems Act, 2004 in September 2004. 36 In addition, the National Institute of Health (NIH) located at Islamabad regularly refurbishes guidelines and monitors research in life sciences to protect Pakistani citizens from any precarious use of dangerous pathogens. Its public health strategy has been focusing on the eradication of microbes by using powerful medical weaponry, i.e. antibiotics, anti-malarias vaccines, etc. On June 22, 2005, Ambassador Masood Khan, Pakistan’s permanent Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 10 representative at Geneva claimed at the Meeting of Experts to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction that Pakistan had adopted following measures for the protection of human beings, animals and plants:  It developed an elaborate system, supported by 2,000 reporting stations, for early detection and surveillance of diseases.  Its National Bio-safety guidelines covering laboratories, research field studies and commercial release of (GMOs) Genetically Modified Organisms and products thereof - were approved in May 2005. These guidelines have the support of the academic institutions, R & D organizations, NGOs, and industry and are in conformity with UNIDO, FAO, WHO, and UNEP guidelines duly adapted to Pakistani socio-economic and geographical environment.  The National Institute of Health (NIH) developed and implemented a code of conduct in accordance with the International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the World Health Assembly.  A Bio-safety Committee has been set up to monitor the research and development activities in life sciences and ensures that the conduct of the scientists in consonance with the provisions of the BTWC.  Faculties and students of leading universities and research institutions have been sensitized of their responsibilities for Bio-safety and Biosecurity. The premier institutions have been encouraged to develop their own codes of conduct.  In September 2004, Pakistan enacted an Act of Parliament to control export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods, technologies, material and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons. 37 The preceding discussion generates impression that Islamabad is very much responsive to the Biosecurity and Bio- safety problems. In reality, these arrangements have Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 11 constructive effect in the realm of Bio-safety, but have limited outcome in the sphere of Biosecurity. Importantly, Pakistan cannot get rid of infectious diseases completely because microbes and the insects, rodents, and other animals that transmit infectious diseases are in a constant state of biological flux and evolution. Secondly, dual-use biological agents are regularly used in the Pakistani laboratories ranging from those in colleges and universities to more advanced national institutions and the research and development facilities run by pharmaceutical companies. Thirdly, it has a less developed health-care infrastructures, especially in the rural areas. It is an open secret that pharmaceutical availability is restricted to urban centers. Whereas, majority of the Pakistanis reside in rural areas, and thereby medical care is unavailable to a larger section of the population/society in the country. Above all, the people have intimidating indifference to the Biosecurity. Pakistan: Intimidating Indifference Pakistan today, is countering both interstate and intrastate security challenges. Since 9/11, its Federal Administrative Tribal Areas (FATA) has become the epicenter of the transnational terrorist organizations, to be called “Terrorist Syndicate led by al Qaeda”, nefarious activities. 38 These organizations successfully established their links with the local (Pakistani) terrorist groups and thereby successfully conducted acts of terrorism in the urban centers of Pakistan. The armed forces of Pakistan launched operation Zerb-e-Azb in June 2015 and successfully destroyed the terrorist sanctuaries located in Tribal Agencies, especially North Waziristan. 39 Conversely, the Biosecurity makes faint scratches on the minds of the Pakistani security observers. There is hardly any reference to Biosecurity in the Pakistani electronic and print media. Even the international meetings of public health and law enforcement officials, which take place annually in Geneva to discuss improved capabilities for responding to an attack with biological weapons and outbreaks of infectious diseases, remained unnoticed in the Pakistani media. Moreover, Biosecurity has also failed to Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 12 attract the attention of the Pakistani social scientists in their academic discourse as well as in literature produced by security analysts’ on National Security of Pakistan. 40 Admittedly, a few Pakistani biologists enthusiastically have been campaigning to create awareness about both the Biosecurity puzzles and preventive apparatus of Bio-safety. 41 Similarly, a few organizations have been working for the environmental sustainability. The natural scientists campaign, certainly, maximize the awareness and efficacy of the Bio- safety practices and kit. It could not be an alternative to the social scientists realization and articulation of Biosecurity phenomenon. Hence, the initiation of Biosecurity puzzle discourse among the Pakistani social scientists is imperative. Although, Pakistan’s geostrategic environment has germinated a vibrant security debate in the country, yet an absence of deliberation on Biosecurity warrants a serious attention. What are the causes of this apathetic attitude towards Biosecurity in Pakistan? Hypothetically, three factors seem responsible for this apathetic attitude: First, both India and Pakistan are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention. That is why; the Pakistani strategic pundits are not deliberating the threat of an attack with biological weapons and outbreaks of infectious diseases. Similarly, the military planners of Pakistan are least concerned about biological weapons as well as Biosecurity challenges. Second, the Tehrik-i-Taliban and al Qaeda attacks in Pakistan, regardless of their enormous impact, were conventional in nature till the writing of these lines. A suicidal attack with a Biological device would have had much more of devastating effect than their attacks with conventional devices in densely populated centers of Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, and Quetta. The absence of the biological terrorism’s precedent provides luxury to the civil law enforcement agencies in Pakistan to ignore the Biosecurity related threats till the small parcel containing a small amount of deadly anthrax spores reached in the Prime Minister secretariat at Islamabad in October 2011. 42 Third, although a few American security analysts had highlighted the challenges of Biosecurity in the twenty-first century, yet scarcity of deliberation on the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 13 subject continues at both global and domestic levels, including Pakistan. On July 22, 2012, Talat Naseer Pasha (Vice Chancellor of the University of Veterinary and Animal Sciences, Lahore) stated that: “No Biosecurity rules exist in the country.” 43 Hence, both government agencies and civil society do not comprehend the intensity of infectious pathogens threat to human beings, live-stoke industry and valuable crops in the globalized world. Moreover, the developed world’s donor agencies, which provide mega financial support to the non-governmental organizations or civil society activists in Pakistan to create awareness and devise countermeasures to the non-traditional security threats, are not forthcoming in Biosecurity realm. The military planners’ indifference towards Biosecurity puzzle is understandable. The modern armed forces, including Pakistani armed forces, possess advanced lethal weapons than biological weapons, such as nuclear weapons. Secondly, being a party to BTWC, Pakistani armed forces are prohibited to use biological weapons. However, the civil law enforcement agencies or relevant government departments and ministries (Ministry of Interior/Health/Agriculture) casual or apathetic attitude towards Biosecurity are incomprehensible. Significantly, the disinclination of the terrorist groups to use the infectious pathogens in their terrorist attacks in Pakistan and elsewhere has generated a misguided impression about the comprehensiveness of Biosecurity apparatus in the country. We have fortunately not seen our worst fears become reality. The objective analysis, however, underscores that Biological Weapons, presently, lack significance in the terrorist’s strategy and tactics. Simultaneously, we don’t have even a hint of the level of bioscientific-biotechnical capability of transnational terrorist organization possess. Realistically, nothing can guarantee that ideologically motivated and manifestly ruthless terrorist groups will not use biological agents for maximizing their attacks’ impact in the densely populated centers of Pakistan. In addition, the biological weapons might be used by the terrorists to cause large-scale Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 14 damage to our agriculture and live-stock industry by killing economically valuable crops and animals. The following are a few factors which need serious attention of both the state and society because they could contribute negatively to the Biosecurity apparatus in Pakistan. Naturally Occurring Diseases Naturally occurring disease outbreaks are important source of lethal organisms. Indeed, natural out breaks are the ultimate origin of the agents historically used in nations’ biological weapons programs. For example: Avian Influenza and Zoonotic Diseases. The Influenza A virus has various sub types and is mostly found in birds – particularly wild aquatic birds. Avian influenza is highly pathogenic, which refers to its high mortality rate in poultry infections. The virus is also highly resistant to avian host immune systems, making it difficult for experts to develop vaccines to the strains, which have limited effectiveness because of the speed at which influenza evolves. In a few countries, Avian influenza also spread from bird-to-human. The avian influence has been spreading due to the increase in poultry production without improved Biosecurity measures, free range duck production and live bird markets – which may allow greater likelihood of infected birds mixing with healthy birds – and the close contact between poultry and people during the raising and slaughter of poultry. 44 Importantly, due to the bird migration, the deadly viruses spread in other parts of the world. For example, the summer 1999 outbreak of the West Nile virus in New York was caused by an infected traveler or mosquito transported from the Middle East. Later, it spread in other states of the United States. 45 Moreover, the Zoonotic diseases such as anthrax, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, cysticercosis, echinococcosis (hydatid disease) and rabies are endemic in many developing countries of Africa, Asia and South and Central America. Many of the most affected countries have poor or nonexistent veterinary public health (VPH) infrastructures. 46 In Pakistan, the poultry industry has been flourishing without any systematic government regulatory Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 15 apparatus. The increasing number of control-sheds to breed chickens in Pakistan alarms the probability of the spread of Avian influenza in the country. Resurrect of Infectious Diseases The revolutionary developments in genetics, genomics and other areas of the biomedical sciences create possibilities for the resurrection of infectious pandemic virus. For instance, in October 2005, a team of US scientists, headed by Jeffery Taubenberger from the US Armed Forces Institute of Pathology published the full sequence of the highly virulent strain of influenza virus that caused the Spanish influenza pandemic in the winter of 1918–1919 and killed up to 50 million people worldwide. The report was the paradigmatic proof to the reconstruction of the Spanish influenza virus. 47 The Biological sciences maturity, especially in the area of biotechnology in Pakistan necessitates that government should adopt preventive measures to check the misuse of the genetics or genomics’ experts in the country. Unintended Consequences of Research The Biological weapons are not the only type of risk to involve biological agents. There are also inadvertent and accidental creation of micro-organisms and bioregulators that have enhanced potential for causing disease. For instance, Australian researchers had inadvertently developed a lethal mouse virus—mousepox. The results of mousepox experiment were published. It was noted that the experiment could be easily replicated and verified in independent laboratories. This information had widespread terror within the international defense and medical community. It is because smallpox and mousepox are very closely related. 48 While commenting on the mousepox, virus expert Professor John Oxford claimed that he would not have expected this result. He added: “though, that while rare, it is inevitable that unpredictable events will occur, which is why such experiments are closely monitored and performed in isolated laboratories.” 49 The creation of mousepox manifests that the Scientists can acquire potentially Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 16 deadly biological agents in the course of legitimate research. 50 Hence, the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan ought to chalk out a policy, which without harming the scientific research publication prevents the crisis akin to mousepox publication. Laboratory Accidents The pathogens (including high consequence pathogens) and toxins can be found in clinical laboratories, hospitals, research universities, private industry, and numerous government facilities. Many of these facilities are easily accessible to the public. Moreover, the fermenters required to produce biological agents in large quantities are widely used in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and even beer industries. The probability of accident cannot be ruled out. The alarming factor is that if an incident (accident, inadvertent release, and deliberate release) involving a biological agent occurs; it is not possible to immediately identify what type of biological risk had caused it. It is because the biological agents are invisible and silent killers. Most of the microbes used in the research laboratories are not visible to naked eye, usually do not have any smell or taste and have incubation periods ranging from weeks to month. Moreover, the bacteria and viruses have reproducing ability and thereby microbes’ number continues multiplying after the initial dissemination. Thus, it is imperative that the industry which uses biological agents, and academic institutions having biological laboratories ought to have contingency planning and equipments to tackle the incidents that entail the release of biological agents. Lack of Awareness The results of mousepox experiment were published. It was noted that the experiment could be easily replicated and verified in independent labs. This information had widespread terror within the international defense and medical community. The scientist consulted Australian Ministry of Defence before disseminating their research finds about the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 17 lethal mousepox virus. When they published their findings, along with a description of the materials and methods, in the Journal of Virology in 2001 ( Jackson et al, 2001), critics complained that they had thereby alerted would-be terrorists to new ways of making biological weapons and had provided them with explicit instructions. 51 The possibility of reconstruction of Spanish influenza by rogue state scientists has been increased after the publication of full sequence of the highly virulent Spanish influenza or the availability of its full genome sequence on the internet. 52 The preceding discussed incident necessitates that the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan makes it compulsory for both biologists and the scientific journals publishers in the country to consult the defence ministry before such publications. Negligence Eckard Wimmer pointed out that “Bioterrorism relies mostly on infectious agents. Defence against these agents rests principally on research aiming to limit the impact of a harmful agent through either novel drugs or new vaccines.” 53 The shocking reality is that despite the realization of Biosecurity significance, the rate of bio-defence vaccine development has not kept pace with the growing number of biological threats facing the entire international community. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks claimed that: “Of the forty-nine biological threat agents identified by the [U.S.] Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the [U.S.] Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has licensed vaccines to protect against only four agents on this list (anthrax, cholera, plague, and smallpox). Each of these vaccines was developed in the 1970s or earlier, and none is proven to protect humans against weaponized versions of these pathogens. 54 It was estimated that one needs $300 million to $1 billion and seven to ten years to bring a single vaccine to market. 55 In addition, the U.S. regulatory framework for preventing the proliferation of Biological Weapons has negatively influenced the Bio-defence research. The trial of Dr. Thomas Butler, chief of infectious diseases at Texas Tech University Medical School, terrorized the researchers working in the field of biological sciences. 56 Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 18 Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society for Microbiology, stated, “If I had select agents in my lab, I think I'd give serious consideration in the morning as to whether I really want to do this or not.” 57 Deliberate Misuse The rapid progress in biotechnology makes possible the creation of epidemic viruses in a few days. For instance, biologist could synthesize poliovirus in a few days. 58 In the near future, for example, sophisticated terrorists might exploit gene-synthesis technology to recreate deadly viruses in the laboratory, thereby circumventing the strict controls on access to “select agents” of bioterrorism concern. 59 There is a need to prevent such a deliberate misuse of virsuses. Domestic Migration In Pakistan, humanity is on the move from rural areas to urban centers. The unchecked urban population expansion raises the statistical probability that pathogens will be transmitted, whether from person to person or vector—insect, rodent, or other—to person. As Laurie Garrett noted that: “Urbanization and global migration propel radical changes in human behavior as well as in the ecological relationship between microbes and humans. Almost invariably in large cities, sex industries arise and multiple-partner sex becomes more common, prompting rapid increases in sexually transmitted diseases. Black market access to antimicrobials is greater in urban centers, leading to overuse or outright misuse of the precious drugs and the emergence of resistant bacteria and parasites. Intravenous drug abusers’ practice of sharing syringes is a ready vehicle for the transmission of microbes. Under funded urban health facilities often become unhygienic centers for the dissemination of disease rather than its control.” 60 Hence, the megacities, like Karachi, Lahore, etc, of Pakistan are vulnerable to epidemics and unusual outbreaks of disease due to inadequate sewage and water systems, housing, and public health provisions. For instance, in the Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 19 recent year’s people in different cities of Pakistan suffered from super lethal dengue hemorrhagic fever. Dengue Fever: Intelligent Move The constructive role of the government and aid agencies to prevent the water borne diseases has increased during the recent years. They have launched an awareness campaign and warn about the likely spread of epidemics, particularly of water-borne diseases such as cholera, in the flood-stricken areas prior to the monsoon season. 61 Realizing the threat of dengue fever spread in 2012, the government took precautionary measures. On August 27, 2012, the federal government organizations, including cantonment boards and Pakistan Railways, were asked to launch anti-dengue campaigns in their jurisdictions to support the efforts of the Provincial governments to avert the dengue mosquitoes spread and prevent dengue fever outbreak. 62 The Punjab government had also taken effective measures to prevent the dengue epidemic. It announced September 2, 2012 as Anti- Dengue Day in Punjab. In Lahore, a citywide dengue awareness campaign was launched during the last week of August 2012. Since then, every year, various government departments, hospitals, schools and universities have been participating in the campaign. ‘Doctors and nurses have been trained to deal with the potential epidemic. Lahore has been festooned with anti-dengue mosquito kits, leaflets and billboards bearing necessary information on recognizing and treating the symptoms of the disease, but most importantly, how to prevent dengue mosquito breeding.’ 63 This campaign has immense dividends and thereby both the central and provincial governments have spared funds for the continuity of this campaign. Punjab Government’s Health Ministry department announced to restart the anti-dengue campaign on February15, 2015. 64 Backward Health-Facilities Being a developing state, Pakistan is lacking financial and human resources to provide adequate health facilities to its Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 20 entire population. Therefore, the detection and prevention of infectious diseases, such as Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF), 65 at early stage is very remote, especially in rural areas and peripheral districts of the country. Some time one counters this problem in the advanced urban cities of Pakistan, as well. For instance, in September 2010, Rasheeda Begum, aged 35, from Village Toot, Dhoke Golguppa of Tehsil Pindigheb, Attock, was infected with Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic Fever (CCHF). Neither her local hospital nor the Holy Family Hospital, Rawalpindi was able to treat her. She received proper medicinal treatment from Shifa Hospital, which is one of the costliest hospitals in Islamabad, Pakistan. It was reported that the treatment costs her from Rs 30,000 to Rs35,000 per day and the family was not in a position of retaining treatment at Shifa Hospital. 66 The National Institute of Health reported that eight employees of Holy Family Hospital suffered from CCHF. General perception was that these employs were exposed to CCHF while attending to two patients, one of whom died on September 24, 2010. On October 1, 2010, four suspected CCHF patients were hospitalised in Peshawar. The NIH had confirmed that the Congo virus was responsible for Dr. Hasnain Shah’s death in Abbottabad in early September 2010. Similar incidents reported from Karachi during the same month. For example, two persons died due to CCHF in September 2010. 67 On August 29, 2012, Abdur Razzaq from a village in the area of Choa Sayden Shah, District Chakwal died at the Holy Family Hospital due to CCHF disease. 68 Rabies is a severe viral disease caused by a virus ‘Rabdo- Virus’ carried in the saliva of infected animal and is transmitted to human beings through bites, scratches or licks even. It is fatal if not treated properly. It was reported in the newspaper on the World Rabies Day (September 28, 2010) that in most parts of Pakistan including major cities like Rawalpindi, the ideal treatment for suspected rabies patients was not available in the public sector hospitals and in primary and secondary healthcare facilities despite the fact that the disease had claimed nearly 25,000 deaths within past one decade. Dr. Shahab Akhtar Qazi, National Coordinator of Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 21 Rabies Prevention Programme at National Institute of Health, Islamabad, pointed out: “We have not been given any funds for the last three years for running prevention and awareness activities.” 69 The incapability of the government hospital to treat rabies patient was reported on August 29, 2012. It was reported that in Faisalabad, a person died due to non availability of rabies vaccination in the government hospitals. Importantly, situation of these hospitals has not changed even in 2015. The aforementioned incidents of CCHF and Rabies highlighted two important factors: First, the government hospitals were incapable to detect, report, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease, such as Zoonotic diseases, in their vicinity that have the potential to spread across locally, nationally and internationally. Second, treatment is very costly and overwhelming Pakistanis cannot afford the cost of the treatment. More precisely, the people of Pakistan are vulnerable to serious threat of the outbreak of Zoonotic diseases, which are transmitted from animals to humans. Natural Calamity: Floods Pakistan faced one of the worst flood crises in its history from late July to September 2010. 70 The devastating floods destroyed large populated and agricultural areas of Pakistan. Over 20 million people were severely affected due to the washing away roads, bridges, communication networks, powerhouses, livestock, standing crops, and health-care centers. 71 The floods created various health problems for the people. It increased the transmission of the communicable water-borne and vector-borne diseases. Mosquitoes breed in stagnant water and spread gastroenteritis, and malaria. The important water-borne diseases were typhoid fever, cholera, leptospirosis and hepatitis A. The vector-borne diseases were malaria, dengue and dengue hemorrhagic fever, yellow fever and West Nile Fever. 72 Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 22 Agriculture Industry: Livestock and Poultry The domestic animals are an integral part of the socio- economic activities of the rural areas of Pakistan. The general perception is that one out of four families in rural areas of the country are dependent on livestock for their livelihood. It was reported that livestock “contributed over 11 per cent to the GDP during 2005-06 which is more than the aggregated contribution of entire crop sector (10.3 per cent) of the country.” 73 Despite its impressive contribution in the national economy, the sustainable operational budgets for Veterinary Services are insufficient in the country. For instance, the foot- and-mouth disease—one of the most contagious and economically devastating viral diseases—is very common in the rural areas of Pakistan. It causes a high rate of sickness in cattle, buffalo, sheep and goats. Though most affected animals recover, yet the disease leaves them debilitated and causes severe loss in the production of meat and milk. Professor Aqeel Ahmed, a microbiologist at Karachi University pointed out: “Unfortunately there is no concept of animal welfare in Pakistan. Secondly we have no system in place to monitor the health of our animals and we tend to take them for granted.” 74 Interestingly, the government of Pakistan had set veterinary hospitals at municipal or union council level, but their performance is questionable due to the lack of both professional commitment of the veterinary doctors and financial resources. Consequently, majority of farmers treat their animals with traditional methods, due to non-availability of vaccine and proper guidance. The Poultry sector is one of the fastest growing sectors in Pakistan. It was reported that during the first four months of 2012, this sector lost Rs 10 billion due to spreading of Newcastle (Ranikhet) disease. Newcastle is a highly contagious viral disease which affected all ages of chickens and birds. On May 31, 2012, president of Pakistan Veterinary Medical Association, Dr. Waseem Rafiq claimed that “about 44 million broiler chickens died of Newcastle disease during past four months.” 75 Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 23 Countermeasures The preceding discussion manifests that Pakistan is vulnerable to biological threats. Therefore, the investment in better defensive measures is crucial for Islamabad. Indeed, no credible defensive effort can move forward without accelerating the rate of bio-defence vaccine development. Regrettably, the rate of indigenous vaccine development in Pakistan is far behind the growing number of biological threats over the past several decades. Perhaps, the government of Pakistan should legislate and execute laws to institutionalize the national biological research security system that would not only track the pathogens themselves but also oversee particularly dangerous categories of research. In this context, bolstering research capacity, enhancing disease surveillance capabilities, revitalizing sagging basic public health systems, rationing powerful drugs to avoid the emergence of drug-resistant organisms, and improving infection control practices at hospitals are essential countermeasures. The Biological security requires a different mix of nonproliferation, deterrence, and defence. It also needs laboratory Bio-security measures. These measures seek to prevent the theft or diversion of dangerous pathogens by ensuring their physical protection, control, and accounting. Second, the government needs to improve the Public Health Infrastructure at the Union, Tehsil, District, Provincial and National levels for detecting unusual outbreaks of infectious diseases at an early stage, and for dispensing antibiotics and other medical countermeasures. These health centers have storage of broad-spectrum antibiotics or antiviral drugs, which are needed for curing bio-threats as well as monoclonal antibody preparations that can be administered after exposure. Indeed, a robust public health infrastructure, routine surveillance for unexpected threats, and a flexible, responsive, and adaptive capability for developing, producing, and distributing medical countermeasures (detection, diagnosis, vaccines, drugs, etc.) is critical. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 24 The following are a few important preventive and curing measures:  The pathological laboratories across the country ought to be established and strengthened for the sake of surveillance and detection of infectious diseases. These pathological laboratories not only cooperate among themselves, but also strengthen cooperation between the relevant organizations and enhance their response readiness  The doctors and nurses are also trained for the detection of infectious diseases like smallpox or pathogenic microorganisms and toxins.  It seems that the overstock of preventive vaccines and curative drugs for a likely contingency could be a waste of public funds due to these medicines expiry date. Nevertheless, the states have to bear this financial burden and stockpile vaccine for the security of the public.  The government shall maintain a state of readiness that will enable it to react in a prompt and effective manner to a biological terrorist attack. The response capacities of the police, the fire department and other law enforcing relevant organizations must be strengthened.  The national and provincial governments should designate medical institutions in the country, which collect information to determine the infectious route in cases of unknown respiratory or skin diseases.  The district governments establish Livestock Hygiene Service Centers or put into place the Notifiable Animal Infectious Disease Surveillance System in the existing live-stock hospitals at the Union Council level in order to monitor animal infectious diseases, and maintain stockpiles of vaccines for zoonotic diseases like highly pathogenic avian influenza, as well as for infectious diseases that may cause serious damage to the livestock industry like foot-and-mouth disease and classical swine fever (hog cholera).  Counter Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) terrorism squads, equipped with advanced Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 25 equipment and machinery, such as CBRN reconnaissance vehicles, chemical surveillance devices, decontamination vehicles, personal protection equipments, portable detectors for biological substances and chemical protection suits, and the conduct of research and development into CBRN alarm devices and decontamination kits, are established in the major cities of the country. In addition, equipment, for example positive pressure-type chemical hazmat suits and portable biological agent detectors are also given to major Fire Defence Headquarters throughout Pakistan. Conclusion Admittedly, neither it is possible to devise a technological fix to biological threats, nor a State/institution is capable to address biosecurity challenges single-handedly. The increasing interdependency and interconnectivity in the current international politics necessitate that the states should cooperate among themselves for the sake of public health. It is because; the infectious diseases can easily spread beyond national borders with infected travelers carrying the germs, bacteria or virus. Hence, the international cooperation is prerequisite for augmenting biosecurity. Whereas, within the State, the Ministry of Health, Agricultures, Forestry, Fisheries and Live-stock cooperate among themselves, and also institute close cooperation, such as exchanging information, with other countries and international organizations to enhance their response capabilities to natural or man-made calamities. The complex nature of Biosecurity challenges underscores that no nation and no institution are capable to deal with them on its own. The only way to deal with these threats and challenges is through an integrated and allied strategic approach, which includes both non-military and military capabilities of like-minded nations. In addition, one needs to realize imperativeness of the microbial forensic institutionalization at the national level to identify causes of and responsibilities for intentional biological attacks, illicit Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 26 biological weapons programs and/or naturally occurring disease outbreaks. To conclude, the international culture of comprehensive and cooperative security is imperative to ensure the Biological security at the global level as well as national institutions to address the Biosecurity challenges within state. Notes 1 Biosecurity means the protection of people and agriculture against disease threats, whether from biological weapons or natural outbreak. Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 3 (May - Jun., 2002), p. 122. 2 WHO, Laboratory Biosafety Manual – Third Edition, http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_C SR_LYO_2004_11/en/ 3 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe, Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9 (November 2007), p. 7. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/ST_Reports/ST_Report_No_9.pdf, accessed on November 30, 2010. 4 “2003 Meeting of States Parties,” BWC Sixth Review Conference, Geneva Switzerland (November 2006), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/12F9BC8D8F5D B0B6C12571A200318F92/$file/BWC_Backgrounder.pdf, accessed on December 20,, 2010. 5 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Op. cit, p. 7. 6 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Tucker, accessed on August 25, 2010. 7 Quoted in Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter, 2003/2004), p. 124. 8 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Op.cit. 9 Brigadier (Retd) Naeem Salik, “Biological & Radiological Terrorism: Probability, Consequences and Consequences Mitigation: A Case Study on Pakistan,” LNCV Publications, September 2007, p. 5. 10 The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS, naturally occurred during 2002 and 2003. It killed 9.6 percent of those it infected, a fatality Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 27 rate almost four times higher than the 1918 flu’s. Lynn C. Klotz and Edward J. Sylvester, “The unacceptable risks of a man-made pandemic,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 7, 2012. http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-unacceptable-risks-of- man-made-pandemic, accessed on August 17, 2012. 11 This year's outbreak of the H1N1 virus, which causes swine flu, is the deadliest in India since 2010. The northern state of Rajasthan has been worst affected. Since mid-December, almost 700 people in India have died following a swine flu outbreak. “India struggles with deadly swine flu outbreak,” BBC News, February 20, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-31547455, accessed on April 15, 2015. “700 people die of swine flu outbreak in India since mid- December,” The Express Tribune, February 21, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/841959/700-people-die-of-swine-flu- outbreak-in-india-since-mid-december/, accessed on April 15, 2015. 12 “Suspected swine flu patient dies in Lahore,” The Express Tribune, April 14, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/story/869677/suspected-swine-flu- patient-dies-in-lahore/, accessed on April 15, 2015. 13 Muhammad Qasim, “Private hospital staff put under observation after death of CCHF patient,” The News International, May 14, 2015. 14 Since five years the cases about the victims of Naegleria fowleri have been reported in the press. Ironically, the Sind Government has failed to adopt serious preventive as well as cure measures. Naegleria fowleri (an amoeba found in rivers, lakes, springs, drinking water networks and poorly chlorinated swimming pools). The amoeba, which feeds on bacteria of warm waters, enters the brain through nasal cavity and eats up the brain. Hasan Mansoor, “Alarm as ‘brain-eating amoeba’ kills two more in Karachi,” Dawn, May 16, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1182241/alarm-as-brain-eating-amoeba- kills-two-more-in-karachi, accessed on May 16, 2015. See also Hasan Mansoor, “Thar deaths, scary diseases overshadow health legislation in 2014,” Dawn, January 12, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1156412, accessed on May 1, 2015. 15 It was reported that the camels haddied while grazing gram at Noorpur Thal, Shah Hussain, Katimar, Shahuwala and Nawan Sagu (of Khushab district). A camel starts shivering and expired within 10 minutes. “Mysterious disease’ claims lives of 500 camels,” Dawn, May 13, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1181646/mysterious-disease-claims-lives-of- 500-camels, accessed on May 14, 2014. 16 “Pakistan needs to do more to rid polio virus,” The Nation, May 20, 2015. http://nation.com.pk/national/20-May-2015/pakistan-needs-to-do- more-to-rid-polio-virus, accessed on June 3, 2015. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 28 17 Polio is one of the diseases which is incurable but can be prevented. Polio virus when invades nervous system through blood stream, causes Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) the person’s life become cripple. Mohan L. Bhootrani, Syed Mohammad Tahir. “Polio Free Pakistan: Reality or Dream?,” JLUMHS, Vol 11: No. 03, September-December 2012, p. 122. http://beta.lumhs.edu.pk/jlumhs/Vol11No03/pdfs/v11n3e01.pdf, accessed on June 6, 2015. 18 “Polio eradication efforts in Pakistan have been plagued by religious, cultural and political opposition having fallen victim to misinterpreted theological opposition. Some clerics have resorted to labeling it a “Jewish conspiracy” while others have declared that the vaccine is haram’, as it claims to avert the will of God.” Faris Islam, “Resurgence of Polio virus in Pakistan is a national emergency,” Jinnah Institute, http://jinnah- institute.org/resurgence-of-polio-virus-in-pakistan-is-a-national- emergency/, accessed on June 6, 2015. 19 Lahore is the second biggest city of Pakistan. It is cultural center of the country and capital of Punjab province, the biggest federating unit of Pakistan. 20 The author has noted the reemergence of FMD disease in cattle’s since mid 2010, in a few villages of District Sargodha and Mandi-Bahudin, Punjab, Pakistan. 21 The disease was originally reported in China over 20 years ago, and has been spreading to citrus in regions in different continents. Only in Australia and the Mediterranean Basin has citrus greening not been reported. Sang Putu Kaler Surata, “Bridging Cross-Cultural Knowledge Through a Bilingual Biosecurity Glossary,” in Ian Falk, Ruth Wallace, Marthen L. Ndoen, ed. Managing Biosecurity Across Borders (London: Springer, 2011), pp. 130-131 22 Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance, and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC),” Asian Security Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 7, September 2010, p. 1. 23 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op.cit p. 122. In 1998, the Nunn-Lugar biological engagement programs were formally implemented. 24 Laura A. Meyerson and Jamie K. Reaser, “Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach,” Op. cit, p. 595. 25 Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit., p. 124. 26 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), p. 105. Similar definitions of laboratory Biosecurity are used by Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 29 World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to the WHO laboratory Biosecurity refers to institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion, or intentional release of pathogens and toxins. The OECD defines Biosecurity as “institutional and personal security measures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release of pathogens, or parts of them, toxin- producing organism, as well as such toxins that are held, transferred and/ or supplied by BRCs (Biological Resources Centers). Reference No. 50 in Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Spring 2010), pp. 105-106. 27 Various definitions of Biosecurity are: The protection of a country, region, location’s or firm’s from economic, environmental and/or human health from harmful organisms; (2) procedures followed or measures taken to safeguard the flora and fauna of a country etc. against exotic pests and diseases; (3) a strategic and integrated approach that encompasses the policy and regulatory frameworks (including instruments and activities) that analyze and manage risks in the sectors of food safety, animal life and health, and plant life and health, including associated environmental risk; (4) effort to prevent, reduce or eliminate the threats, applications and effects of intentional and unintentional misuse of life sciences and technology, while promoting and pursuing beneficial pursuits and uses; (5) measures to protect against the malicious use of pathogens, parts of them, or their toxins in direct or indirect acts against humans, livestock or crops; (6) the implementation of measures that reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents. Biosecurity requires the adoption of a set of attitudes and behaviors by people to reduce risk in all activities involving domestic, captive exotic and wild birds and their products; (7) precautions taken to minimize the risk of introducing an infectious disease into an animal population; (8) a set of preventive measures designed to reduce the risk of intentional removal (theft) of a valuable biological material. These preventative measures are a combination of systems and practices usually put into place at a legitimate bioscience laboratory that could be sources of pathogens and toxins for malicious use. Although security is usually thought of in terms of “Guards, Gates, and Guns”, biosecurity encompasses much more than that and requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and law enforcement officials. “Glossary of Biosecurity Management” in in Ian Falk, Ruth Wallace, Marthen L. Ndoen, ed. Managing Biosecurity Across Borders (London: Springer, 2011), pp. 244- 245. 28 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” Op. cit, pp. 106 and 115. 29 Ibid, p. 107. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 30 30 Ibid, p. 107. 31 Dr. Alexander Kelle, Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness in Europe, Op.cit. 32 Gregory D. Koblentz, “Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses,” Op.cit, p. 106. “The mousepox experience,” An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw on dual-use research, EMBO reports, December 11, 2009. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v11/n1/full/embor2009270.html, accessed on September 2, 2010 33 The Australia Group was established in 1985. It “is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement through which 40 countries, as well as the European Commission, coordinate their national export controls to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents-as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge-to countries and non-state entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons (CBW) capabilities.” Sensitive items on these control lists can be divided into five categories: 1. Chemical weapons precursors-chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons. 2. Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment, and related technology-items that can be used either for civilian purposes or for chemical weapons production, such as reactors, storage tanks, pumps, and valves. 3. Biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms, whether natural or genetically modified, such as smallpox, Marburg, foot- and-mouth disease, and anthrax. 4. Toxins-poisonous substances either made by living organisms or produced synthetically that adversely affect humans, animals, or plants, such as botulinum toxin and ricin. 5. Dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research and biological weapons production, such as fermenters, containment facilities, freeze-drying equipment, and aerosol testing chambers. Daryl Kimball, “The Australia Group at a Glance,” December 2010. http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/australiagroup, accessed on August 26, 2012. 34 Both acts prohibit universities from employing individuals from several foreign countries (currently seven-- Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria) to work with select biological agents and toxins listed by HHS. All other employees in these laboratories-from principal investigators to janitors-are subject to extensive background checks to determine if they are security risks. This regulation also applies to non- Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 31 U.S. citizens who have become permanent U.S. residents. In addition, student and researcher visa applications from twenty-six primarily Muslim countries have been held up for special review by the U.S. government through the Visas Condor program, initiated in November 2001. This review is conducted by the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force, which is led by Attorney General John and comprises experts from a variety of U.S. federal agencies, including the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Secret Service, and Customs. Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit, pp. 138-139. See also Reference No. 56, p. 139. 35 Brigadier (Retd) Naeem Salik, “Biological & Radiological Terrorism: Probability, Consequences and Consequences Mitigation: A Case Study on Pakistan,” Op.cit., p. 10. 36 The Gazette of Pakistan, Extra Ordinary Published by Authority, Registered No. M-302/L-7646, Islamabad, Monday, September 27, 2004. http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1321333389_458.pdf, accessed on May 9, 2015. 37 Statement by Mr. Masood Khan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN Geneva, at the Meeting of Experts to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Geneva, June 22, 2005. http://missions.itu.int/~pakistan/2005_Statements/CD/ecwbtwc/BTWC _statement_PR_22JUne-2005.htm, accessed on October 1, 2010. 38 For details see Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, “Threat of Extremism and Terrorist Syndicate Beyond FATA,” Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 17, Issue 2, Winter 2010. pp. 19-49. 39 Syed Irfan Raza, “Zarb-i-Azb to be completed by year-end: minister,” Dawn, February 16, 2015. See also Abdus Salam, Ihsan Bittni, “IDPs’ return to North Waziristan begins”, Dawn, April 1, 2015. 40 Quaid-I-Azam University is the leading university in the country. Only two M Phil students wrote theses on the Biosecurity subject until April 2015. Currently, only one PhD student is working on the said subject. 41 Workshop on Raising Awareness on Dual Use Concerns in Biotechnology, Organized by the Department of Biotechnology Quaid-i- Azam University and School of Politics & International Relations, Quaid-i- Azam University, Islamabad. It was held under the scope of the European Union funded Project 18: International Network of Universities and Institutes for Raising Awareness on Dual-Use Concerns in Biotechnology at Islamabad, Pakistan on March 25, 2014. Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 32 42 “Anthrax mailed to Pakistani PM's office: spokesman,” Reuters, February 1, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-pakistan-anthrax- idUSTRE81019Y20120201, accessed on May 9, 2012 43 “Poultry sector attractive for investment: UVAS VC,” Business Recorder, July 22, 2012. http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/business-a-economy/69432- poultry-sector-attractive-for-investment-uvas-vc-.html, accessed on August 18, 2012. 44 Dr. Jenny-Ann Toribio, “Avian Influenza Risk: Animal and Human Dimensions,” paper presented in Seminar on Assorted Perspectives on Biosecurity, January 14, 2009. http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/Events/Ass%20Persp%20on%20Biosecurity.h tml, accessed on September 13, 2010. 45 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op. cit, pp. 129- 130. 46 “Neglected zoonotic diseases (NZD),” World Health Organization, http://www.who.int/neglected_diseases/zoonoses/en/, accessed on October 22, 2010. 47 Jan van Aken, “When risk outweighs benefit,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S 10. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 48 The Australian scientists used standard genetic engineering techniques to modify a mousepox virus to contain the gene for interleukin-4 (IL-4) as well as the mouse egg shell protein (ZP3). The egg shell protein was there to encourage a contraceptive response against the mouse's own eggs. The IL-4 gene was there to increase the immune response against ZP3 protein, so as to make the contraceptive response more effective. The mousepox itself was a relatively benign virus, of little threat to the health of the mice themselves. When the genetically engineered mousepox was put into mice the mice simply died. The supposedly benign mousepox virus was discovered to have become a killer. And not only a killer, but a super-killer: 100% of the mice died. The scientists thought they might learn something useful about mouse contraception, but instead they had learned how to create a universally fatal virus. And this killer virus had been created via a very simple genetic manipulation, accessible to every country with a few PhD microbiologists. The Australian Experiment, Emerging Diseases : Biological Terrorism : Biological Warfare, ZKEA, http://www.zkea.com/archives/archive05002.html, accessed on September 2, 2010. . Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal NDU Journal 2015 33 49 Quoted in “Mouse Virus or Bioweapon?” BBC World Service, January 17, 2001. http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/sci_tech/highlights/010117_mousepo x.shtml, accessed on September 2, 2010. 50 Christopber F. Cbyba, “Towards Biological Security,” Op. cit, p. 127. 51 “The mousepox experience,” An interview with Ronald Jackson and Ian Ramshaw on dual-use research, EMBO reports, December 11, 2009. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v11/n1/full/embor2009270.html, accessed on September 2, 2010. 52 Jan van Aken, “When risk outweighs benefit,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S 10. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 53 Eckard Wimmer, “The test-tube synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus,” EMBO reports, Vol. 7, Special Issue (2006), p. S8. http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v7/n1s/pdf/7400728.pdf accessed on September 16, 2010. 54 Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op. cit, p. 129. 55 Ibid. p. 135. 56 In January 2003, Dr. Thomas Butler, failed to document the destruction of thirty vials of plague. Unable to account for the vials, Dr. Butler suggested that they might have been misplaced or stolen. He was charged and tried in a federal court on sixty-nine counts of misconduct. 57 Quoted in Kendall Hoyt and Stephen G. Brooks, “A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity,” Op.cit, p. 142. 58 Eckard Wimmer, “The test-tube synthesis of a chemical called poliovirus,” Op.cit. 59 Jonathan B. Tucker, “Seeking Biosecurity Without Verification: The New U.S. Strategy on Biothreats,” Op.cit. 60 Laurie Garrett, “The Return of Infectious Disease,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (January - February, 1996), p. 72. 61 “Disease risk eases in parts of flood-hit areas: UNICEF,” Daily Times, September 15, 2010. 62 “Dengue Session,” Dawn, August 29, 2012. 63 “Anti-Dengue Campaign,” Daily Times, August 30, 2012. 64 “Anti-dengue campaign to begin from 15 th ,” Daily Times, February 08, 2015. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/08-Feb-2015/anti- dengue-campaign-to-begin-from-15th Biosecurity and Pakistan: A Critical Appraisal NDU Journal 2015 34 65 Studies reveal that Viral Hemorrhagic fever family including Crimean- Congo Haemorrhagic Fever and Ebola are zoonotic, diseases that animals cause to humans. Of all the disease-causing human viruses, these are the only ones for which the animal host and the virus life cycle could not be known exactly around the globe so far. 66 Muhammad Qasim, “Suspected patient at Shifa Hospital confirmed positive,” The News International, September 22, 2010. 67 “Deadly virus,” Dawn, October 3, 2010. 68 “Doctors, staff exposed yet safe,” The News International, September 2, 2012. 69 Muhammad Qasim, “Pakistan severely lacks ideal treatment,” The News International, September 29, 2010. 70 According to the United Nations assessment report, the destruction caused by the floods in Pakistan were greater than the damage from the 2004 Asian tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and the 2010 Haiti earthquake, combined. 71 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as the North-West Frontier Province, North into Gilgit-Baltistan and South into Southern Punjab and Sindh were the worst hit areas by floods. 72 “Floods may lead to increase in vector-borne diseases: WHO,” The News International, October 4, 2010. http://www.thenews.com.pk/latest- news/2351.htm 73 “Pakistan Livestock Census 2006,” Pakistan Bureau of Statistics. http://www.pbs.gov.pk/node/441, accessed on August 18, 2012. 74 Quoted in Hasan Abdullah, “Diseases transmitted from animals to pose threat,” Dawn, August 18, 2010. 75 “Poultry sector faces Rs10 billion loss in four months,” Business Recorder, May 31, 2012. http://www.brecorder.com/pakistan/business-a- economy/60156-poultry-sector-faces-rs10-billion-loss-in-four-months-. html

Baidu
sogou